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Abstract 
We assess drivers of FDI in a panel of BRICS and MINT countries for the period 2001-2011.  
We bundle and unbundle governance determinants using a battery of contemporary and non-
contemporary estimation techniques. The following findings are established. First, for both 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications, while determinants for gross FDI are 
significant, they are not for net FDI. Second, for contemporary specifications, the significance 
of the governance dynamics is as follows in increasing order of magnitude: general 
governance, political governance, economic governance, political stability, regulation quality 
and government effectiveness.  The motivation to bundle governance variables is articulated 
by the effect of political governance. Third, for non-contemporary specifications, the 
significance of governance variables is as follows in ascending order of magnitude: economic 
governance, institutional governance, general governance, corruption-control, political 
governance and political stability. The importance of combining governance indicators is 
captured by the effects of political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance. The results indicate that the simultaneous implementation of the various 
components of governance clarifies a country’s attractiveness for FDI location. Policy 
implications are discussed with particular emphasis on the timing of FDI and its targeting. 
 
JEL Classification: C52; F21; F23; P37; P39 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, emerging countries, governance 
 
Acknowledgement 
We are highly indebted to Akpan Uduak for sharing his dataset.   
                                                             
1
 Simplice A. Asongu is Lead economist in the Research Department of the AGDI (asongus@afridev.org).  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Foreign-owned investments have been in existence since the colonial era in many parts 
of the globe. After a substantial drop in these investments in the 1980s, the need for security 
in food, energy and water is pushing many countries to adopt this new strategy of investment, 
especially in the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis (Arezki et al., 2013). In essence, policies 
favouring restrictions to trade and capital that were predominant in developing nations in the 
1970s and 1980s were considerably eased after these same countries suffered from declining 
economic prosperity and foreign investment (Rodrik, 1998). Hence, some domestic industries 
for which these policies were initially meant to protect  bore much of the brunt of diminishing 
social and private returns (De Mello, 1997; Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006; UNESCAP, 2000
2
 
Apkan et al., 2014). Hence, the policies known as ‘structural adjusment’ were fundamentally 
meant to address the capital scarcity in developing countries, while at the same time enabling 
multinational corporations from the more developed world to benefit from the cheap labour in 
less developed nations  (Asongu, 2013a, 2014a; UNCTAD
3
, 2013)
4
.  
With the current trend of land grab in the world, there is a growing strand in the 
literature focusing on foreign land acquisitions (FLA) in developing countries (Osabuohien, 
2014, 2015). This rush for foreign direct investment (FDI/FLA) extends well beyond African, 
Asian & Latin American countries in the south of the globe to Ukraine, Russia, and Australia. 
Two types of foreign investor have been documented: a European private sector characterised 
for the most part by investment banks & hedge funds and Asian investment of private and 
public origin (UN, 2010).  Reasons advanced for motivating this FDI/FLA range from debates 
to more fundamental poverty alleviation goals. Consistent with World Bank (2007),Lipton 
(2009) and Arezki et al. (2013),  the underlying rush needs to provide some guarantee for 
initiatives favouring smallholder structures of agriculture which are friendlier towards poverty 
alleviation. The intuition for this line of narrative is the Asian experience of relatively higher 
poverty reduction which has been substantially driven by small scale agriculture (Loayza & 
Raddatz 2010; De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2010; Asongu & Nguena, 2015;). Collier (2008) also 
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 It is also interesting to note that not all privatisation policies delivered the much needed FDI. For instance, as 
shown by Rolfe & Woodward (2004), this has been the experience of Zambia. The need for FDI has been further 
highlighted in recent literature on population studies  which show that unless other sources of investment are 
channelled into developing countries (especially in Africa), only public investment would be used to setttle 
issues arising from the burgeoning population growth and resulting unmployment (Asongu, 2013b).  
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follows this argument for sub-Saharan Africa because the region has been substantially 
affected by the 2008 global food price changes.  
 The theoretical underpinnings of FDI/FLA location substantially draws on Vernon 
(1966) who also documented a product life cycle which articulates four main stages: 
introduction, growth, maturity and decline. According to this pattern, new products are 
introduced in developed and later diffused to less developed nations over time. Hence, these 
fundamental stages susbtantially influence the location decision of mulitinational corporations 
to inter alia set-up production facilities abroad and to benefit from lower production cost and 
address concerns of growing demand in less developed countries. Consistent with Apkan et 
al. (2014), the electric paradigm conceived by Dunning (1988, 1993, 2000) provide a  general 
perspective for rationalizing FDI location decisions by multinational companies. According to 
this model, factors like the geography, scope and industrial elements of FDI by mutlinational 
corporations are substantially affected by interactions in the following three sets of 
interdependent indicators: location specificity, strategic ownership advantages and 
internationalisation. This is broadly consistent with the recent survey of theoretical 
underpinnings on determinants by Faeth (2009). 
 We devote some space to discussing the findings of the empirical literature on the 
deteminants of FDI/FLA. Consistent with recent literature (Akpan et al., 2014), it depends on 
a number of factors, among others: estimation techniques, context of papers, data span and 
proxies used for indicators (Moosa, 2002; Asiedu, 2006; Hajzler, 2014; Moosa & Cardak, 
2006; Asiedu, 2002; Ranjan & Agrawal, 2011; Buchanan et al., 2012; Sekkat & Veganzones-
Varoudakis, 2007). We follow Asongu & Nguena (2014) in discussing them in six main 
strands, namely: quality of business climate (infrastructure, trade, returns & institutions), 
tenure security, weak governance, resource-grab motivations, regional factors and global 
economic shocks. The first is linked to FDI while the others broadly apply to FDI & FLA.  
 On the first strand that is focused on business climate , Amendolagine et al. (2013) 
have investigated factors motivating FDI and concluded that features like, local partners, 
market factors and time are significant. Other documented characteristics include: 
infrastructure and return to capital (Asiedu, 2002), market size, trade openness and 
availability of infrastructure (Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Bartels et al, 2009; Kinda, 2010; 
Darley, 2012; Anyanwu, 2012; Akpan et al., 2014; Büthe & Milner, 2008; Bartels et al., 
2014; Jadhav, 2012); the abundance of cheap labour and incentive packages (Vijayakumar et 
al., 2010; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2014b). Institutional factors include: corruption-control (De 
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Maria, 2010; Wei, 2010), democracy (Asiedu & Lien, 2011), political stability (Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007), economic governance (Jadhav & Katti, 2012) and good institutional quality 
(Gastanaga et al., 1998; Neumayer & Spess,  2005; Kinda, 2010; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012;  
Cleeve, 2012; ; Abdioglu et al., 2013; Hayakawa et al., 2013;  Bartels et al., 2014).  
 In the second strand, Areski et al. (2013) who document the attractive force of weak 
governance have also confirmed business climate quality is an attractive feature for FDI/FLA. 
Here, bad governance motivates foreign investments. While Kolstad & Wiig (2011) have 
confirmed poor institutional quality as the primary factor motivating FDI from China to 
Africa, Asongu & Aminkeng (2013) have balanced the narrative by concluding that the 
motivations of Western companies are not much different from those of Chinese corporations.  
 The third stream focuses on land tenure security issues which have been documented 
as an important factor in FLA (UN, 2010; Arezki et al., 2013). Systems of land tenure affect 
food security (Economic Commission for Africa, 2014) and have been identified as one of the 
fundamental factors influencing FDI/FLA (Ingwe et al. 2010; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). The 
narrative which is in line with Wouterse et al. (2011) broadly characterises the issues as 
“taken away the land of peasants which are possessed on communal tenure systems that 
starkly contrast with official land titles related to ‘indigenous colonialist’ controlled 
neoliberal capitalist systems who have used various forms of manipulation in the past to 
alienate Africans from their land” (Asongu & Nguena, 2014, p.4). German et al. (2011) argue 
that in spite of their recognition, customary rights are not fundamentally protected by FLA 
agreements. Along the same lines: Thaler (2013) concludes that foreign investment target 
countries that are characterised by  authoritarian and corrupt governments associated with 
weak land tenure security; in countries where the rights of the local population are not clearly 
articulated and governance is poor, FLAs are linked to substantial risks for the population 
(Liu, 2013) and local institutions do not substantially affect decisions in FLA because of 
overwhelming state power (Osabuohien 2014). 
 Resource-seeking motivations constitute the fourth strand (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 
2013; Lay & Nolte, 2014). Whereas a negative nexus has been established between natural 
resource-wealth and FDI in the presence of protectionist policies (Jadhav, 2012; Rogmans & 
Ebbers, 2013), the mainstream narrative suggests a reverse relationship. For instance, Lay & 
Nolte (2014) have extended Arezki et al. (2013) to confirm the positive connection between 
natural resource endowment and FDI. The Kostad & Wiig (2011) conclusion on a resource-
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thirsty China has also been debunked by Asongu & Aminkeng (2013) who conclude that the 
resource motivations of Western nations are very much identical to those of China.  
 In the fifth strand, we find literature on global shocks like food and financial crises as 
the principal drivers of FDI/FLA for agriculture purposes (Wouterse et al., 2011). Following 
the 2008 food crisis, countries that greatly depended on food imports have been acquiring 
land abroad for food security agricultural purposes (UN, 2010). According to Clapp (2013), 
Fairbairn (2013) & Isakson (2013), financial investors and private sectors seized the 
opportunity of speculative investments when about 25 countries imposed food export 
restrictions in 2008. Investment banks that engaged in such speculation with agricultural 
investment funds include, inter alia: Knight Frank in the UK, Goldman Sachs & Black Rock 
in the USA and Deutsche Bank in Germany. In summary, consistent with German et al. 
(2011), the increasing interest in biofuels and rapid growth of emerging economies are some 
factors that have influenced the speed and scale of FDI/FLA.   
 Factors in the sixth strand are regional. Before the 2007/2008 food & financial crises, 
Asiedu (2002) had established that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) received relatively less FDI by 
virtue of its geographic location. Anyanwu (2012), who does not subscribe to Asiedu’s 
position, concludes that the Eastern and Southern sub-regions in Africa are predisposed to 
obtain more FDI. A new stream of research is consistent with the view that SSA is a good 
candidate for FLA location decisions because of  among other things: the relatively low use of 
water supply which currently stands in the neighbourhood of 2% of underground reserves 
(UN, 2010), well nurtured North-South FDI relations (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013), the 
existence of local partners based on strong colonial networks (Amendolagine et al., 2013) and 
China’s strategy that is oriented towards non-interference and partnership (Yin & Vaschetto, 
2011). 
 In the light of the above, FDI is mutually beneficial to both investment corporations 
and domestic economies. Some  advantages for host nations include: finance, employment 
and positive externalities like managerial experience, technology & skills transfer and 
corporate governance. The benefits of the investing company are, inter alia: cheap labour, 
market access, natural resource availability and appealing externalities from bilateral and 
multilateral trade policies (Akpan et al., 2014). In accordance with the narrative,  as of 2012, 
FDI in  developing nations soared substantially over the past decades to about 52% of global 
flows (UNCTAD, 2013). Among these recipients, a set of countries have accounted for most 
of the FDI flowing into developing economies: the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China & 
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South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & Turkey). According to the World 
Bank (2013), these countries account for most the FDI in their respective regions
5
: Mexico in 
Central America, Nigeria in Africa, India in Southern Asia, Indonesia in South-Eastern Asia, 
Turkey in West Asia, Brazil in South America and China in East Asia.  
Table 1 below presents some stylized facts of the BRICS and MINT. Consistent with 
Apkan et al. (2014), the former accounted for 15% of world GDP and attracted 26% of global 
FDI. Some interesting common features among BRICS and MINT are: membership in the 
Great 20 (G20), excluding Nigeria, burgeoning youth population and FDI-friendly policies. 
Other stylized facts presented in the table clearly articulate the evolving importance of these 
nations. For instance, between 2001 and 2012, FDI to the nine countries rose to 510.4 billion 
from 113.6 billion. Within the same horizon, these countries accounted for 51% of the 
population in the world, attracted about 30% of global FDI and 19% of world GDP (World 
Bank, 2013).  
 
Table 1: Stylized Facts on BRICS and MINT 
  
GDP 
(constant 
2005 
US$, 
billions) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2005 
US$) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
FDI net 
inflows 
(BoP, 
current 
US$, 
billions)* 
Population 
growth 
(annual %) 
Population, 
total, 
millions 
Natural 
resources, 
Share of 
GDP* 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Brazil 1136.56 5721.23 0.87 0.00 71.54 0.87 198.66 5.72 0.73 
China 4522.14 3348.01 7.80 7.28 280.07 0.49 1350.70 9.09 0.70 
India 1368.76 1106.80 3.24 1.94 32.19 1.26 1236.69 7.36 0.55 
Indonesia 427.47 1731.59 6.23 4.91 19.24 1.25 246.86 10.00 0.63 
Mexico 997.10 8250.87 3.92 2.65 21.50 1.24 120.85 9.02 0.78 
Nigeria 177.67 1052.34 6.55 3.62 8.84 2.79 168.83 35.77 0.47 
Russia 980.91 6834.01 3.44 3.03 55.08 0.40 143.53 22.03 0.79 
South Africa 307.31 6003.46 2.55 1.34 5.89 1.18 51.19 10.64 0.63 
Turkey 628.43 8492.61 2.24 0.94 16.05 1.28 74.00 0.84 0.72 
*2011 data                   
 Source of data: UNDP (2013), World Bank (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
In spite of the increasing importance of the nine nations in attracting FDI and 
influencing the shape of the global economy, as far as we have reviwed, the FDI literature on 
these countries is scanty. FDI determinants in the BRICS have been examined by 
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Vijayakumar et al. (2010) on panel data for the period 1975-2007 to conclude that, whereas 
the impact of trade and inflation are not insignificant, factors like market size, labour cost, 
infrastructure and capital formation are more favorable to FDI inflows. Jadhav (2012) 
concludes that FDI is fundamentally market-oriented since ‘natural resources’ have a negative 
impact, while a positive effect is found in trade, market size and the rule of law.  Jadhav & 
Katti (2012) use the same periodicity to conclude that regulation quality and government 
effectiveness have positive effects, while voice & accountabiliy, corruption-control and 
political instability have negative effects. Akpan et al. (2014), a study in the literature closest 
to the present line of inquiry, assessed both the BRICS  and MINT economies with data from 
2001 to 2011. The authors established that whereas the quality of institutions and resources 
have insignificant effects, the impact of trade openness, infrastructure and market size  are  
positive for FDI. These studies leave room for improvement in at least four areas: control for 
endogeneity, the comtemporarenous nature of  the relationships, complementing the BRICS 
with the MINT and articulating the essence of  governance .  
In light of the above, our contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, contingent on 
the Hausman test for endogeneity, we use panel Fixed-effects (FE) to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in terms of country- and time-effects.  Second, we introduce contemporary and 
non-contemporary specifications to assess whether determinants are contingent on their 
contemporary features. Third, but for Akpan et al. (2014), the underlying literature has been 
limited to the BRICS. Hence, we complement existing literature by providing evidence from 
both the BRICS and MINT economies. Fourth, we have found that the effects of governance 
may be insignificant (Akpan et al., 2014) or limited to the rule of law (Jadhav, 2012) and 
economic governance (Jadhav & Katti, 2012). We extend the dimension of institutions by 
bundling and unbundling governance dynamics. In essence, we use ten governance indicators, 
notably: institutional governance, economic governance, political governance, general 
governance, corruption-control, rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, 
voice & accountability and political stability/no voilence
6
.  
The intuition for articulating the quality of institutions draws on a recent stream of 
interesting literature focusing on bundling and unbundling institutions for development 
outcomes. Oluwatobi et al. (2014) investigated the effect of various governance components 
on innovation in Africa and concluded that economic governance (regulation quality and 
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different from institutional governance wihich  is measured by corruption-control and rule of law.  
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government effectiveness) is the most  important. Andrés & Asongu (2013) have investigated 
how various governance dyanmics affect the fight against software piracy and found 
corruption-control to be the most effective tool. Andrés et al. (2014)  employ the same 
governance mechanisms to access how upholding intellectual property rights (IPR) treaties 
affect the knowledge economy (KE) and  concluded that formal institutions are a ncessary, 
but not sufficient condition for KE in Africa. Asongu & Kodila-Tedika (2013) followed the 
same strategy employed by the two preceding studies in assessing which governance channels 
are most effective in the fight against African conflicts and crimes. They conclude corruption-
control is the most effective institutional weapon.  Drawing on the above, Asongu & 
Nwachukwu (2014a) bundled and unbundled institutions in predicting the Arab Spring. This 
process has also been employed for the measurement of political governance (voice & 
accountability and political stability/no violence) to show the effect of lifelong learning on 
political stability and non-violence in Africa (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2014b).  
The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner. Data and methodology are 
covered in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and discussion of results. We 
conclude in Section  4.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 The study assesses a panel of the nine BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China & South 
Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & Turkey) fast growing emerging countries 
with data from Apkan et al. (2014) for the period 2001-2011. Data from the underlying study 
which is consistent with UNCTAD's classification of FDI determinants (see Table 2) is 
obtained from the World Development Indicators and the World Governance Indicator 
databases of the World Bank. Two dependent variables are used in the analysis, notably Gross 
FDI and Net FDI. The choice of these dependent variables is in accordance with the 
underpinning literature which is based on four principal types of FDI, namely: the ratio of 
FDI net inflow as a percentage of GDP (Lehnert et al., 2013), net FDI flows as a percentage 
of GDP (Asiedu, 2002), unidirectional FDI inflow into recipient countries (Rogmans & 
Ebbers, 2013) and net FDI inflow (Jadhav, 2002). Following Apkan et al. (2014), we use Net 
FDI and Gross FDI.  
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 The adopted determinants or independent variables have been discussed in the 
literature above. They are in accordance with the UNCTAD’s classification in Table 2. The 
exogenous variables are: natural resources, inflation, infrastructure, bank credit and ten 
governance variables. While the first-four are control variables, the governance dynamics are 
the key variables of interest. They include: (i) voice & accountability, (ii) poltiical stability, 
(iii) regulation quality, (iv) government effectivenesss, (v) the rule of law and (vi) corruption-
control, (vii) political governance, (viii) economic governance, (ix) institutional governance 
and (x) general governance. The latter four of the governance dynamic are Principal 
Components (PCs) generated by bundling the former six individual governance variables 
using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Method explained in Section 3.2.1 below.  On 
the expected signs of the governance variables, a key point is  noteworthy here. As discussed 
in the preceding section, there is as yet no consensus on the effects of governance dynamics. 
This is the partial motivation here for bundling and unbundling the impact of goverance 
elements. With respect to the set of control variables, we expect a positive relationship with 
FDI, except for inflation. High inflation is potentially detrimental to FDI.  
Table 2: UNCTAD's Classification of FDI determinants 
Determining Variables  Examples 
Policy variables Tax policy, trade policy, privatization policy, 
macroeconomic policy 
Business variables Investment incentives 
Market-related economic determinants Market size, market growth, market structure 
Resource-related economic determinants Raw materials, labor costs, technology 
Efficiency-related economic determinants Transport and communication costs, labor productivity 
Source: UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3 below. It could be inferred 
from it that the variables are comparable. Moreover, the degree of variation is too substantial 
for us to expect reasonable estimated relationships to emerge.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Mean  S.D Min  Max Obs 
      
Net Foreign Direct Investment (NFDI) 28.979 46.359 -2.977 280.07 99 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.402 1.348 -1.855 6.136 99 
Infrastructure (Number of mobile phones per 100 people) 52.433 39.220 0.210 179.31 99 
Bank Credit (on GDP) 85.019 63.492 4.909 201.58 99 
Natural resources (on GDP) 9.003 8.110 0.294 38.410 99 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 8.580 7.519 -0.765 54.400 99 
Voice & Accountability  -0.192 0.680 -1.681 0.727 99 
Political Stability -0.826 0.613 -2.193 0.286 99 
Regulation Quality -0.104 0.437 -1.322 0.778 99 
Government Effectiveness -0.100 0.454 -1.200 0.691 99 
Rule of Law -0.428 0.458 -1.522 0.279 99 
Corruption Control -0.431 0.462 -1.333 0.612 99 
Political Governance 0.000 1.153 -2.210 1.976 99 
Economic Governance -0.000 1.372 -3.291 2.639 99 
Institutional Governance 0.000 1.348 -3.048 2.412 99 
General Governance  0.000 2.124 -4.650 3.765 99 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 
Consistent with Asongu & Nwachukwu (2014a), the substantial degree of substitution among 
governance indicators in Table 5 implies some overlapping information.  We employ 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to address this concern. The use of the PCA technique 
also enables us to bundle governance variables. This statistical method facilitates the 
reduction of a high set of correlated variables into a smaller combination of uncorrelated 
indicators known as Principal Components (PCs). In the process, four more governance 
indicators are blended from the six individual governance variables identified in Section 2.1. 
The PC governance dynamics comprise: Political governance, which measures the election 
and replacement of political leaders is approximated by: voice & accountability and political 
stability/non-violence; Economic governance, which is the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public commodities, is denoted by regulation quality and government 
effectiveness ; Institutional governance, which is defined as the respect of the State and 
citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them is measured by the rule of law 
and corruption-control (Andrés et al., 2014).    
 Consistent with the underlying literature, we use the Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) 
criterion for the retention of common factors. Hence, we retain factors or PCs with an 
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eigenvalue higher than the mean (or one). In Table 4 below, it can be observed that: General 
governance (G.Gov) which is a first PC has an eigenvalue of 4.514 and represents about 75% 
of variation in the original six individual governance variables. 
  
Table 4: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.305 0.385 0.440 0.441 0.409 0.452 0.752 0.752 4.514 
Second  PC 0.848 -0.461 -0.207 -0.115 0.096 0.048 0.121 0.874 0.731 
Third PC 0.337 0.532 -0.240 0.192 -0.714 0.012 0.064 0.938 0.385 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.664 0.664 1.329 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.335 1.000 0.670 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.941 0.941 1.883 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.058 1.000 0.116 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.909 0.909 1.818 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.090 1.000 0.181 
          
“P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC”.  
 
 Borrowing from Asongu & Nwachukwu (2014b), we devote some space to discussing 
potential concerns that may arise when regressors originate from previous regressions. Three 
issues have been documented by Pagan (1984, p. 242) on the quality of resulting estimators. 
They are: (i) efficiency, (ii) consistency and, (iii) validity of inferences at the second stage of 
the estimation. According to the conclusions of the author, whereas estimators from a two-
step procedure are consistent and efficient, inferences provided by a few are valid. This 
narrative is broadly in accordance with a recent literature on the use methods such as PCA 
which relies on a two-step regression modelling (Oxley & McAleer, 1993; McKenzie & 
McAleer, 1997; Ba & Ng, 2006; Westerlund & Urbain, 2013a).  
 The use of PCs within the framework of this analysis has been documented by 
Westerlund & Urbain (2012, 2013b) who have built on previous papers (Pesaran, 2006; Stock 
& Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012). As to what error 
are inherent in PC regressors, they have remarked on the possibility of normal inferences with 
PC-factors augmenting regressions, if the coefficients that are estimated converge toward 
their real values at the rate: NT , (where T is the number of time series and N, the number of 
cross sections). We argue that, any potential issues of small sample bias are not very feasible 
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here because we are constrained by the sample size. In essence, only nine countries constitute 
the MINT and BRICS among fast growing developing countries.  
Table 5: Correlation Analysis 
           
VA PS RQ GE RL CC Polgov Ecogov Instgov G.Gov  
1.000 0.329 0.542 0.457 0.538 0.623 0.815 0.515 0.614 0.648 VA 
 1.000 0.774 0.759 0.579 0.752 0.815 0.790 0.698 0.817 PS 
  1.000 0.883 0.716 0.886 0.807 0.970 0.840 0.934 RQ 
   1.000 0.827 0.861 0.746 0.970 0.885 0.936 GE 
    1.000 0.818 0.685 0.795 0.953 0.868 RL 
     1.000 0.849 0.900 0.953 0.959 CC 
      1.000 0.800 0.804 0.899 Polgov 
       1.000 0.889 0.963 Ecogov 
        1.000 0.958 Instgov 
         1.000 G.Gov 
           
“P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC”.  
 
3. 2 Estimation Technique  
 We assess contemporary and non-contemporary determinants using panel regressions. 
The choice between panel fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) is decided by the 
outcome of the Hausman test for endogeneity. We also control for time-effects.  
 Assuming the Hausman test for endogeneity is rejected, Eq.(1) and Eq. (2) below 
denote the corresponding contemporary and non-contemporary specifications respectively of 
FE regressions.  
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Where: tiFDI ,  
 is the Foreign Direct Investment for country i
 
at period t ; is a constant,
 
W  
is the vector of determinants i is the country-specific effect, t is the time-specific effect. 
and ti ,  the error term. The regressions are specified with Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.  
  
 The pairwise correlation matrix in Table 6 below helps us in mitigating potential 
problems arising from multicollinearity and overparameterization. Interestingly, the linear 
association between Gross FDI and our governance variables, with the exception of political 
stability/non-violence is negative. The inference is that reforms in these other governance 
variables by themselves could potentially reduce the attractiveness of BRICS and MINT 
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economies as destinations for FDI. Such provides support for the weak governance effect 
suggested by Areski et.al. (2013). This finding is consistent with our indicators of political 
governance, regulation quality, corruption-control, institutional governance and general 
governance regardless of whether the Gross FDI or Net FDI were considered in the 
correlation analysis. By contrast, the correlation coefficients for the indicators of economic 
governance, government effectiveness and the rule of law reverted to a positive sign when Net 
FDI was used in the pairwise correlation. We may surmise that policy actions which enhance 
the quality of institutions in terms of these last three dynamics may help curtail the problem of 
reverse investment or disinvestment in our BRICS and MINT states, even if they might not 
necessarily lead to a significant increase in inward direct investment.  
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix (n for panel A =90)  
                 
Control Variables Governance Dynamics Foreign Investment  
Infra Infla Credit Nres VA PS Pgov RQ GE Egov RL CC Ingov Ggov FDI NFDI  
1.000 -0 .102 0.210 0.277 0.032 0.291 0.198 0.291 0.190 0.248 0.132 0.141 0.143 0.212 0.136 0.183 Infra 
 1.000 -0.0004 0.077 -0.061 -0.274 -0.205 -0.124 -0.254 -0.193 -0.150 -0.253 -0.211 -0.219 -0.157 -0.251 Infla 
   -0.488 0.114 0.548 0.406 0.585 0.682 0.658 0.716 0.703 0.744 0.668 -0.031 0.174 Credit 
   1.000 -0.269 -0.228 -0.305 -0.261 -0.345 -0.312 -0.490 -0.455 -0.495 -0.397 0.057 0.049 Nres 
    1 .000 0.329 0.815 0.542 0.457 0.515 0.538 0.632 0.614 0.648 -0.392 -0.056 VA 
     1.000 0.815 0.774 0.759 0.790 0.579 0.752 0.698 0.817 0.137 0.221 PS 
      1.000 0.807 0.746 0.800 0.685 0.849 0.804 0.899 -0.156 -0.209 Pgov 
       1.000 0.883 0.970 0.716 0.886 0.840 0.934 -0.113 -0.028 RQ 
        1.000 0.970 0.827 0.861 0.885 0.936 -0.143 0.128 GE 
         1.000 0.795 0.900 0.889 0.963 -0.143 0.051 Egov 
          1.000 0.818 0.953 0.868 -0.247 0.028 RL 
           1.000 0.953 0.959 -0.087 -0.067 CC 
            1.000 0.958 -0.175 -0.020 Ingov 
             1.000 -0.151 -0.028 Ggov 
              1.000 0.448 FDI 
               1.000 NFDI 
                 
Infra: Infrastructure. Infla: Inflation. Credit : Domestic Credit. Nres: Natural resources. VA: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. Polgov: Political governance. RQ: Regulation Quality.  
GE: Government Effectiveness. Egov: Economic governance. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Ingov: Institutional governance. Ggov: General governance.  FDI: Gross FDI. NFDI: Net FDI.    
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4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 7 and Table 8 below present contemporary and non-contemporary determinants 
of FDI respectively.  Panel A of either table has Gross FDI as the dependent variable, while 
the endogenous variable for Panel B is Net FDI. The decision as to whether a FE or RE model 
is a better fit is contingent on the outcome of the Hausman test. A rejection of the test implies 
the FE model is a better fit.  
The following broad finding can be established. While the determinants of Gross FDI 
are significant in Panel A, they are overwhelmingly insignificant for Panel B on Net FDI. We 
may therefore suppose that governance reforms in countries with similar long-term attributes 
such as language, culture, religion, climate, demography and ethnicity, would have a 
comparable effect on inward and outward direct investment decisions. This inference is 
consistent with both contemporary and non-contemporary specifications
7
 in Tables 7 and 8 
respectively.  
 
Table 7: Contemporary Determinants (Panel Fixed- and Random-Effects) 
           
 Panel A : Gross FDI  
           
Constant  1.754*** 2.828*** 2.059* 1.504 1.199 0.981 1.341 2.483** 1.580 1.536 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.066) (0.144) (0.226) (0.356) (0.115) (0.013) (0.160) (0.157) 
Voice & Accountability  -0.761** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.039)          
Political Stability --- 1.006*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.007)         
Political  Governance  --- --- 0.595** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.029)        
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 1.669** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.044)       
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- 2.035** --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.024)      
Economic Governance  --- --- --- --- --- 0.832*** --- --- --- --- 
      (0.001)     
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.525 --- --- --- 
       (0.443)    
Corruption-Control  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.004 --- --- 
        (0.714)   
Institutional Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.483 --- 
         (0.100)  
General Govevernance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.561*** 
          (0.006) 
Nresources 0.033 0.072** 0.052*** 0.064** 0.073** 0.079** 0.046 0.046 0.047** 0.065** 
 (0.220) (0.015) (0.000) (0.044) (0.029) (0.041) (0.105) (0.176) (0.028) (0.016) 
Infrastructure 0.007** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.020 -0.021 -0.016 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.019 0.014 0.0009 -0.002 
 (0.305) (0.261) (0.367) (0.567) (0.442) (0.543) (0.352) (0.424) (0.963) (0.880) 
Domestic Credit -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 0.0005 0.003 0.003 0.0003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.797) (0.318) (0.568) (0.967) (0.800) (0.819) (0.951) (0.714) (0.894) (0.819) 
                                                             
7
 ‘Both specifications’ are  used subsequently to refer to ‘contemporary and non-contemporary’ specifications.  
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Hauman test  8.547 6.011 18.404*** 11.258** 12.836** 14.800** 7.262 15.652*** 12.562** 23.843*** 
Time effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -132.1729 -159.038 --- --- --- --- -142.920 --- --- --- 
Within variance  0.733 0.646 --- --- --- --- 0.733 --- --- --- 
Between variance  0.587 1.874 --- --- --- --- 0.939 --- --- --- 
Within  R² --- --- 0.437 0.450 0.434 0.462 --- 0.452 0.423 0.462 
Fisher  --- --- 7.273*** 7.524*** 7.222*** 7.749*** --- 7.553*** 7.019*** 7.741*** 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
           
 Panel B : Net FDI  
           
Constant  39.079 -19.468 40.571 42.172 32.557 36.040 -0.599 45.951 42.000 41.944 
 (0.193) (0.531) (0.160) (0.152) (0.187) (0.176) (0.984) (0.187) (0.154) (0.152) 
Voice & Accountability  -7.631 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.845)          
Political Stability  --- -5.848 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.618) -2.515        
Political  Governance  --- --- (0.811) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
           
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 3.684 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.889)       
Government Effectivness  --- --- --- --- 47.677 --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.220)      
Economic Governance  --- --- --- --- --- 8.324 --- --- --- --- 
      (0.457)     
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- --- --- 18.723 --- --- --- 
       (0.415)    
Corruption-Control --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 7.570 --- --- 
        (0.788)   
Institutional Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5.163 --- 
         (0.670)  
General Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.233 
          (0.705) 
Nresources -0.424 1.382 -0.449 -0.367 0.275 -0.059 1.481 -0.404 -0.370 -0.287 
 (0.747) (0.142 (0.736) (0.755) (0.769) (0.950) (0.111) (0.735) (0.725) (0.809) 
Infrastructure -0.044 0.436*** -0.020 -0.008 0.100 0.065 0.414*** 0.001 -0.0005 0.003 
 (0.911) (0.000) (0.952) (0.980) (0.710) (0.827) (0.000) (0.997) (0.998) (0.991) 
Inflation 0.773 0.658 0.805 0.803 0.873 0.840 0.674 0.912 0.956 0.862 
 (0.158) (0.288) (0.174) (0.162) (0.147) (0.146) (0.279) (0.230) (0.187) (0.162) 
Domestic Credit -0.448 0.032 -0.453 -0.476 -0..379 -0.439 -0.035 -0.495 -0.488 -0.491 
 (0.245) (0.888) (0.265) (0.247) (0.252) (0.247) (0.875) (0.243) (0.246) (0.236) 
Hausman  21.169*** 7.146 20.575*** 17.58*** 10.931* 13.75** 8.536 24.613*** 11.964** 17.77*** 
Time effects  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood --- -482.063 --- --- --- --- -481.896 --- --- --- 
Within variance  --- 635.748 --- --- --- --- 634.301 --- --- --- 
Between variance  --- 2335.06 --- --- --- --- 1964.07 --- --- --- 
Adjusted R² 0.352 --- 0.352 0.352 0.371 0.358 --- 0.352 0.354 0.354 
Fisher  11.292*** --- 11.297*** 11.28*** 11.726*** 11.425*** --- 11.302*** 11.342*** 11.329*** 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
           
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The Random Effects specifications are not modelled with 
time-effects due to issues in degrees of freedom. Accordingly, the matrices become ‘positive definite’ when the model is 
specified with ‘time-effects’.  
 
The results from the contemporary specifications may be summarised as follows. 
First, the significance of governance dynamics are as follows in increasing order of 
magnitude: general governance (0.561), political governance (0.595), economic governance 
(0.832), political stability (1.006), regulation quality (1.669) and government effectiveness 
(2.035). Second, while institutional governance and its corresponding components (rule of 
law and corruption-control) have insignificant effects, the impact of voice & accountability is 
persistently negative. A possible explanation for this surprising result is that freedom of 
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speech, accountability and press reporting on matters such as minimum wages, health and 
safety, environmental controls, tax evasion and human rights abuse may not favour returns to 
direct investment. Third, the motivation to bundle governance variables is articulated by the 
effect of political governance which is significantly positive while one of its components 
(voice and accountability) is consistently negative. Fourth, the signs for the coefficients for 
most of our governance dynamics reverted from negative in the pairwise correlation analysis 
to positive in the panel fixed and random effect models. This may be construed as an 
indication that FDI flows are not simply motivated by governance reforms per se, but by the 
interrelatedness between these structural adjustments and the above-mentioned persistent 
country attributes. Fifth, the significant control variables have the expected signs. 
Accordingly, infrastructure and natural resources positively influence Gross FDI flows. 
The following outcomes are established for non-contemporary specifications in Table 
8. First, the significance of the governance dynamics are as follows in increasing order of 
magnitude: economic governance (0.427), institutional governance (0.485), general 
governance (0.489), corruption-control (0.578), political governance (0.802) and political 
stability (0.908). Second, while regulation quality and government effectiveness have 
insignificant effects on Gross FDI, their combined impact  as captured by the economic 
governance variable is significantly  positive at ten percent level. Third, the decision to bundle 
governance dynamics is justified by the effects of political governance, economic governance 
and institutional governance which varied markedly from those of their individual elements 
either in terms of sign, size and level of statistical significance. For instance, (i) political 
governance is significantly positive while one of its components (voice & accountability) is 
negative (ii) Economic governance is significantly positive while its components (regulation 
quality and government effectiveness) are not and (iii) institutional governance is significant 
while one of its components (rule of law) is not. Fourth, the significant control variables have 
the expected signs. Accordingly, infrastructure, domestic credit and natural resources 
positively influence Gross FDI while inflation has a negative effect.  
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Table 8: Non contemporary determinants (Panel Fixed- and Random-Effects) 
           
 Panel A : Gross FDI 
           
Constant  2.103*** 2.781*** 0.410 -0.795 1.719** -1.196 1.848** -0.310 -0.857 -1.001 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.511) (0.377) (0.010) (0.225) (0.033) (0.639) (0.288) (0.222) 
Voice & Accountability (-1) -0.777** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.021)          
Political Stability (-1) --- 0.908** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.017)         
Political  Governance (-1) --- --- 0.802** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.026)        
Regulation Quality (-1) --- --- --- 0.748 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.201)       
Government Effectiveness(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.890 --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.179)      
Economic Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- 0.427* --- --- --- --- 
      (0.069)     
Rule of Law (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.121 --- --- --- 
       (0.862)    
Corruption-Control (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.578*** --- --- 
        (0.007)   
Institutional Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.485* --- 
         (0.089)  
General Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.489** 
          (0.016) 
Natural Resources (-1) 0.036 0.074** 0.052 0.045 0.049* 0.053 0.055* 0.036 0.039 0.055 
 (0.173) (0.014) (0.106) (0.217) (0.073) (0.132) (0.061) (0.292) (0.246) (0.105) 
Infrastructure (-1) 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.012* 
 (0.323) (0.339) (0.329) (0.176) (0.308) (0.110) (0.236) (0.233) (0.145) (0.090) 
Inflation (-1) -0.051** -0.053*** -0.012 -0.006 -0.051** -0.005 -0.049** 0.0009 0.007 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.190) (0.533) (0.013) (0.572) (0.017) (0.955) (0.610) (0.850) 
Domestic Credit (-1) 0.001 -0.000 0.011 0.021*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (0.778) (0.994) (0.170) (0.007) (0.366) (0.005) (0.678) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) 
Hauman test  7.767 5.196 17.40*** 10.983* 9.124 11.055* 8.670 10.194** 9.944* 17.83*** 
Time effects No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -113.00 -139.056 --- --- -119.311 --- -126.621 --- --- --- 
Within variance  0.7136 0.632 --- --- 0.706 --- 0.693 --- --- --- 
Between variance  0.472 1.823 --- --- 0.618 --- 0.919 --- --- --- 
Within  R² --- --- 0.497 0.435 --- 0.442 --- 0.429 0.446 0.474 
Fisher  --- --- 8.011*** 6.827*** --- 6.949*** --- 6.729*** 7.025*** 7.541*** 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
           
 Panel B : Net FDI  
           
Constant  117.108* 3.216 125.10* 121.89* 13.855 108.01* 17.688 121.013 1.721 119.448 
 (0.098) (0.923) (0.098) (0.098) (0.624) (0.018) (0.594) (0.112) (0.950) (0.113) 
Voice & Accountability (-1) -28.834 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.530)          
Political Stability (-1) --- -0.535 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.965)         
Political  Governance (-1) --- --- 2.438 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.833)        
Regulation Quality (-1) --- --- --- 1.474 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.953)       
Government Effectiveness(-1) --- --- --- --- 37.063 --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.151)      
Economic Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- 7.593 --- --- --- --- 
      (0.471) 21.148    
Rule of Law (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.394) --- --- --- 
           
Corruption-Control (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -17.232 --- --- 
        (0.505)   
Institutional Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.879 --- 
         (0.919)  
General Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.546 
          (0.749) 
Natural Resources (-1) -0.1902 0.859 -0.050 -0.080 0.902 0.194 0.906 -0.085 0.836 -0.002 
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*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The Random Effects specifications are not modelled with 
time-effects due to issues of  degree of freedom.  
 
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
 
 We discuss the results in four main strands: differences in tendencies of effect on 
Gross FDI versus Net FDI; comparing and contrasting contemporary and non-contemporary 
specifications in terms of significance & magnitude and interest of bundling & unbundling 
governance dynamics on contemporary & non-contemporary specifications. 
 First, the fact that the governance dynamic effects on Gross FDI are significant while 
they are insignificant for Net FDI logically implies that the effects of governance may be 
more apparent in FDI outflows or disinvestment. The results are broadly consistent with 
Apkan et al. (2014) that used Net FDI and found no significant effect between governance 
and the dependent variable. The rule of law estimate which is consistently insignificant across 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications is contrary to Jadhav (2012) who 
concluded that it plays a significant positive role in attracting FDI into the BRICS. Given that 
we have enlarged the dataset, the insignificance could be traceable to the MINT countries, 
methodology of estimation and conditionining informaton set or control variables. It should 
be noted that the present line of inquiry and Jadhav (2012) have sample periodicities that are 
almost similar (2001-2011 versus 2000-2009 respectively). The favourable effects of 
regulation quality and government effectiveness from Jadhav & Katti (2012) who have used 
the same periodicity as Jadhav (2012) is confirmed only in contemporary specifications of the  
present study. Only the negative effect of voice & accountability  is confirmed in both 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications. Similarly, the  positive effects of 
political stability, political governance  and general governance are persistently significant in 
both contemporary and non- contemporary models. The reasons for these differences is the 
 (0.848) (0.394) (0.959) (0.926) (0.357) (0.774) (0.361) (0.941) (0.399) (0.997) 
Infrastructure (-1) -0.1745 0.392*** -0.075 -0.068 0.394*** -0.001 0.375*** -0.135 0.371*** -0.051 
 (0.699) (0.001) (0.821) (0.832) (0.000) (0.997) (0.001) (0.704) (0.002) (0.878) 
Inflation (-1) -0.010 -0.106 0.084 0.100 -0.127 0.148 -0.056 -0.187 -0.200 0.153 
 (0.970 (0.870) (0.787) (0.738) (0.848) (0.656) (0.931) (0.671) (0.775) (0.664) 
Domestic Credit (-1) -0.519 0.022 -0.655 -0.625 -0.058 -0.572* -0.034 -0.616 0.069 -0.629 
 (0.108) (0.927) (0.120) (0.111) (0.797) (0.092) (0.885) (0.120) (0.770) (0.126) 
Hausman  13.123** 4.603 15.77*** 16.964*** 8.577 11.736** 6.434 19.33*** 9.085 13.928** 
Time effects  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Log-likelihood --- -432.367 --- --- -434.242 --- -433.583 --- -430.950 --- 
Within variance  --- 681.532 --- --- 654.042 --- 672.085 --- 681.048 --- 
Between variance  --- 2769.32 --- --- 1926.97 --- 2276.81 --- 1717.61 --- 
Adjusted R² 0.347 --- 0.341 0.340 --- 0.346 --- 0.345 --- 0.342 
Fisher  12.262*** --- 12.124*** 12.109*** --- 12.241*** --- 12.21*** --- 12.13*** 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
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same as those presented for deviations from the findings of Jadhav (2012), notably the 
addition of MINT to the sample, estimation technique and data employed.   
 Second, it is worthwhile comparing and contrasting contemporary and non-
contemporary specifications in terms of significance & magnitude.  On similarities: (i) voice 
& accountability, political stability political governance and general governance are 
consistently significant in both types of specifications (contemporary and non-contemporary); 
(ii) economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness) is only significant 
in contemporary specifications, while; (iii) institutional governance and corruption-control 
are exclusively significant in non-contemporary specifications. These comparisons are 
relevant for the timing of FDI location decisions or its targeting. For instance, while factors in 
(i) can be considered in the same year that the FDI flows are being targeted, as well as the 
preceding year, those indicator in (ii) and (iii) are exclusively relevant only in the planning of 
present and future FDIs respectively.  
 With respect to the magnitude of estimated coefficients in the contemporary model, 
the dominance of economic governance and its key components (regulation quality and 
government effectiveness) are consistent with the recent findings of Oluwatobi et al. (2014). 
They have shown that these dimesions are the most effective governance dynamics for 
attracting innovation into Africa. This inference is contingent on the hypothesis that FDI 
could also be a proxy for innovation (Andrés et al., 2014, p.10). With regards to non-
contemporary specifications, political stability and political govenance are most relevant. 
Two policy implications boldly standout: while economic governance matters most for 
present  FDI location decisions, political governance is the most important factor for one-year 
future FDI targets.  
 Third, the reasons for bundling and unbundling govenance dynamics which have 
partially motivated this line of inquiry have been confirmed in the analysis. They are more 
apparent in non-contemporary estimations.  In comtemporary estimations, we have observed 
that while the effect of political governance is positively significant, that of voice & 
accountability, which is one of its constituents, is not. This implies, foreign investors may 
look beyond voice & accountability and consider the  ‘elections and replacement of political 
leaders’ all together in their FDI location decisions.The inference and policy implication 
applies to the interesting findings of non-contemporary specificcations, notably: Economic 
governance is significant while its components (regulation quality and government 
effectiveness) are not; Institutional governance is significant while one of its components 
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(rule of law) is not and general governance is significant while its components (the rule of 
law, government effectiveness and regulation quality) are not. The findings are consistent 
with Asongu & Nwachukwu (2014b) in which lifelong learning (which is the consolidation of 
knowledge acquired during three-levels of education) has a higher effect on political stability 
than the individual independent effects of various educational channels. As a policy 
implication, a concurrent execution of the significant components of the political, economic 
and institutional governance reforms as part of a structural adjustment program could clarify 
the attractiveness of our BRICS and MINT economies as a future destination for FDI.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have assessed the drivers of FDI in a panel of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
& South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & Turkey) countries for the period 
2001-2011.  We have bundled and unbundled governance determinants using a battery of 
contemporary and non-contemporary estimation techniques based on Random- and Fixed-
effects regressions. We have also used a principal component analysis technique in 
amalgamating six governance dimensions into four dynamics. They comprise (i) political 
governance (voice & accountability and political stability), (ii) economic governance 
(regulation quality and government effectiveness), (iii) institutional governance (rule of law 
and corruption-control), and general governance (political, economic and institutional, 
governance dynamics). 
The following four broad general findings are established.  First, while the majority of 
our governance determinants of Gross FDI are significant, they are overwhelmingly 
insignificant for Net FDI. This is consistent with both contemporary and non-contemporary 
specifications.  
 Second, with respect to the contemporary specifications, the significance of the 
governance dynamics in increasing order of magnitude are as follows: general governance 
(0.561), political governance (0.595), economic governance (0.832), political stability 
(1.006), regulation quality (1.669) and government effectiveness (2.035). Then too, while 
institutional governance and its corresponding components (rule of law and corruption-
control) have insignificant effects, the contributions of political governance and its 
dimensions (voice & accountability and political stability) and economic governance and its 
elements (regulation quality and government effectiveness) are significantly different from 
zero. Besides, the decision to bundle governance variables is justified by the effect of political 
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governance which is significantly positive, although the effect of one of its components 
(voice & accountability) is significantly negative.  
Third, in terms of non-contemporary relationships, we note that the significance of the 
governance dynamics in ascending order of magnitude are: economic governance (0.427), 
institutional governance (0.485), general governance (0.489), corruption-control (0.578), 
political governance (0.802) and political stability (0.908). Further, while regulation quality 
and government effectiveness have insignificant separate effects, their combined impact as 
captured by the economic governance indicator is significantly positive at the ten percent 
confidence level.  Moreover, the motivation to blend governance variables is further 
demonstrated by the effects of political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance. For example, political governance is significantly positive while one of its 
components (voice & accountability) is significantly negative. Economic governance is 
significantly positive while its components (regulation quality and government effectiveness) 
are not. Institutional governance is significantly positive while one of its components (rule of 
law) is not.  
Fourth, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in the non-contemporary model is 
all below one, indicating a decreasing impact of past governance reforms on subsequent FDI 
flows, even if the effect of political stability adjustment is the most persistent.  
Policy implications have been discussed, notably: (i) the importance of governance 
reforms in both current and future FDI location decisions, (ii) the persistence of the impact of 
governance determinants on the real-time and one-period Gross and Net FDI flows and (iii) 
the extent to which a synchronized implementation of governance reforms could improve 
positive FDI location decisions.  
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